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Abstract 
 
Source data for computer network security analysis 
takes different forms (alerts, incidents, logs) and each 
source may be voluminous.  Due to the challenge this 
presents for data management, this has often lead to 
security “stovepipe” operations which focus primarily 
on a small number of data sources for analysis with 
little or no automated correlation between data 
sources (although correlation may be done manually).   
We seek to address this systemic problem. 
In previous work we developed a unified correlated 
logging system (UCLog) that automatically processes 
alerts from different devices. We take this work one 
step further by presenting the architecture and 
applications of UCLog+ which adds the new capability 
to correlate between alerts and incidents and raw data 
located on remote logs. UCLog+ can be used for 
forensic analysis including queries and report 
generation but more importantly it can be used for 
near-real-time situational awareness of attack patterns 
in progress. The system, implemented with open source 
tools, can also be a repository for secure information 
sharing by different organizations.  
 
Keywords: secure information sharing, security event management, 
security monitoring, log management 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For security monitoring and forensics, organizations 
currently use a mix of commercial, open source, and 
homegrown system scripts to generate alerts. In 
addition, many organizations have incident response 
teams that investigate and document security events 
often using an automated incident database system for 
indexed retrieval.   Lastly, there are many logs, which 
store raw data about device and network status.  
Typically these three sources of information relevant to 
security (alerts, incidents, raw data logs) are handled in 
different systems and any correlation between these 
sources is accomplished only with manual intervention 
(both complex and tedious). 
In previous work we developed a unified correlated 
logging system (UCLog) that automatically processes 
alerts from different log sources [7].  We performed a 
proof of concept that showed automated log correlation 
of alerts is both feasible and beneficial [1].   
In this paper we present UCLog+, which is an 
incrementally improved system which adds the 
capability to correlate beyond alert logs to also include 
incidents documented by an incident response team 
and raw data in common network logs (syslogs, 
NetFlows). The goal is automated integrated access 
between alerts, incidents, and raw data.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 surveys related work.  Section 3 discusses 
available data sources.  Section 4 presents the 
architecture of UCLog+. We present experimental 
results in Section 5. We end with a summary and 
conclusions in Section 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Several tools or methods to increase the efficiency 
of security operations in the management of security-
related data have been proposed. MieLog [12] provides 
visualization and statistical analysis tools for specific 
logs. NVisionIP is a situational awareness visualization 
tool for NetFlows raw data logs that can be extended to 
integrate other data sources [5]. Fisk et al. developed a 
set of tools that provide SQL-like manipulation of 
streaming network data from different sources [3]. Lee 
and Stolfo proposed using data mining to correlate IDS 
alerts and improve alert accuracy [6]. Sah [10] 
describes a database for large-scale archival.  
Computer security incident databases have been 
proposed to integrate different methods of access and 
query. In particular, Ohio-State University developed 
two incident databases: IDB and SITAR. IDB 
automatically inserts simple alerts (with minimal 
information), and SITAR is used for manually storing 
more extensive incident information [2]. UCLog+ 
differs from these in its design choices and  
functionality. The databases from Ohio-State do not 
consider raw data logs (other than email alerts) and 
these systems are not well documented, making it hard 
to learn from their experience. 
UCLog+ complements these existing solutions by 
providing a central repository for data of different 
types -- alerts, incidents, and raw data can be correlated 
from the same interface.  
 
3. Security Data Sources 
 
There are many potential data sources for security 
analysis.  Since each computer network environment is 
unique (in terms of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities) 
we must consider the widest range of potential data 
sources in order to provide maximum flexibility for 
organizations to tailor specific solutions.   
The most basic issue is the form of data sources to 
consider.  At the lowest level kernel events provide 
state change information and deal with kernel entities 
such as file descriptors and process IDs.  However, 
data management of kernel events does not scale 
except for all but the smallest networks.  Also humans 
who perform security analysis are interested in higher-
level state such as files, process names, and 
connections over specified time intervals.  Examples of 
requirements elicited from security engineers include 
the top processes, top connections, and file 
modifications in the last hour; attacks which match 
known signatures; and anomalous activity exhibited by 
rare or new behavior.   
The need for high-level situational awareness 
makes alerts from detectors appropriate for one form of 
data source. Alerts can be generated by firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) such as Snort [9] or 
Bro [8], file system integrity checkers like Tripwire 
[4], or alert generation tools for applications like 
RedAlert [11]. Large networked systems usually run a 
mixture of different alert generators.  
A second form of security source data we consider 
is incident data documented from response teams 
investigating events.  These events may be initiated 
from alarms or from human requests.  Sometimes this 
information is referred to as meta-alarms since humans 
document their analysis of multiple alarms (multiple 
machines compromised by the same attack, multiple 
attacks on the network, etc.).  Incident data may be 
stored in writing, Email messages, flat computer files, 
a database, or sometimes not formally stored at all.  
For instance, until recently the events reported to and 
investigated by the CERT/CC were stored only in 
Email format.  Incident data is a rich source of security 
information since it often includes insight from human 
analysis over time. However, historical incident data 
has been difficult to integrate into security analysis 
since it is hard to parse from free-form writing in 
different formats.   
  The third and last form of security source data we 
consider are raw data logs.  Examples include 
NetFlows and application-specific syslogs (e.g. web, 
Kerberos, dhcp, snmp, etc.).  NetFlows are a network 
based log that can be generated by routers (e.g. Cisco) 
or specialized open source software (e.g. Argus) 
documenting traffic flows passing through an 
observation point.  These raw data log files are 
typically flat files (not organized in any way) that 
record status events from sources as they occur in near-
real-time.  The status events can be in different 
granularities such as low (record only important 
events) to high (record everything).    
For this work we converge on these three forms of 
source data: (1) alarms, (2) incidents, and (3) raw data 
logs). There are obviously more than three forms of 
source data for security analysis but we posit these 
three forms are commonly implemented by 
organizations.  Our goal is to create a system to access 
these three different forms of source data in a central 
repository that allows for automated correlation and 
flexible query ability.  While it can be argued that a 
security data management system is not needed since 
data in these three forms is already available for 
analysis, we find from personal experience that 
manually correlating information between these 
different forms is painful to accomplish such only 
attempted in the extreme cases.1 
                                                                          
1  The first author has experience as Head of Security 
Operations and Incident Response at NCSA 2002-2003. 
 
4. UCLog+ Architecture/Implementation 
 
The concept behind the UCLog+ system 
architecture is to store alerts and incident records in a 
central database while launching search commands to 
large raw data files using encrypted ssh connections.  
This allows raw data logs to remain where they are 
located without moving their entire contents over the 
network. The records in the database can be queried 
directly and scripts are created for search commands 
against raw data files whose results will be delivered 
back to the database and back to the user GUI.  The 
end result is transparent awareness of events for 
security analysis without the user having to manually 
manipulate alerts, incidents, or raw data logs.   
The UCLog+ system consists of several 
independent and cooperating elements. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between these elements: 
 
• Cron jobs to process the incoming email alerts 
• Perl scripts parse the alerts and automatically 
insert the necessary records in the database. 
• A PostgreSQL database for incident storage 
• Pgpsql procedures for specific database 
operations 
• PHP scripts for the web-based GUI 
• Flat NetFlow logs stored on a different server 
• Perl scripts for correlation with flat NetFlows 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  UCLog+ Architecture 
 
The database consists of several tables: incidents, 
types, Emails and Hosts. The types table contains 
incident or alert types (e.g. scan, password attack) 
information; it can be as specific as the alerts allow. 
The hosts table stores information about 
internal/external hosts involved in one or more 
incidents. The Emails table stores emails detailing the 
incidents, including original alerts sent in emails to the 
system and non-standard follow-up emails between 
Security Engineers. Finally, the incidents table is the 
main table, containing one record per incident 
involving a host; comments can be added to help 
revisit the incidents in the future. The table creation 
script is shown in Table 1. 
 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_hostid; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_incidentid; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_typeid; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_emailid; 
CREATE TABLE hosts ( 
        hostid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY 
                DEFAULT nextval('seq_hostid'), 
        name VARCHAR(30) UNIQUE NOT NULL 
                CONSTRAINT invalid_host_name 
                CHECK(name LIKE '%.%.%.%'), 
        ip INET, 
        owner_name VARCHAR(35), 
        owner_email VARCHAR(35) 
); 
CREATE TABLE emails ( 
        emailid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY 
                DEFAULT nextval('seq_emailid'), 
        date DATE NOT NULL, 
        source TEXT, 
        comments TEXT 
); 
CREATE TABLE types ( 
        typeid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY 
                DEFAULT nextval('seq_typeid'), 
        name VARCHAR(25) UNIQUE NOT NULL, 
        description VARCHAR(256) 
); 
CREATE TABLE incidents ( 
        incidentid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY 
                DEFAULT nextval('seq_incidentid'), 
        date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL, 
        host INTEGER REFERENCES hosts (hostid), 
        type INTEGER REFERENCES types (typeid), 
        email INTEGER REFERENCES emails (emailid), 
        comments TEXT 
); 
                Table 1. Table Creation Script 
 
Storing and organizing alerts in a relational 
database adds value by allowing complex queries that 
would otherwise be time challenged due to parsing of 
flat files containing alerts or incidents. Common pre-
defined queries and customizable queries can be 
accessed from the web interface. A free-form SQL 
query interface is provided for increased flexibility. 
The query results are shown in HTML tables and can 
be downloaded as plain text files (delimited by TABs) 
if needed. For example, the SQL statement for a pre-
defined query is shown in Table 2. 
 
SELECT incidents.date, hosts.name, types.description 
FROM incidents,hosts,types,emails 
WHERE host=hostid AND type=typeid AND  
email=emailid; 
             Table 2. Pre-Defined SQL Query  
 
Several PHP scripts generate HTML pages that 
provide a user interface to the database data. The 
PostgreSQL database can also be queried via 
command-line, but the HTML interface is more user-
friendly. When viewing the incidents, the user directs 
queries transparently to the appropriate raw data logs 
through the web interface. Perl scripts are used to parse 
the raw logs for a particular host and/or time period 
and generate smaller and easier to handle files that can 
be viewed on-line. Other Perl scripts parse the 
incoming email alerts and insert them into the 
appropriate tables, performing host name/IP lookup if 
necessary.  
Reports and statistics are also accessible from the 
web interface. Gnuplot is accessed by PHP scripts to 
generate graphs showing different useful information 
obtained by querying the database. For example, a pre-
defined report in the system queries the database to 
obtain a percentage of incidents per day of the week. 
The SQL query is shown in Table 3. 
 
SELECT my_dow(date) AS day, 
count(*)/(select count(*)/100.0 from incidents) AS cnt, 
extract(DOW FROM date) AS dow 
FROM incidents GROUP BY day, dow  
ORDER BY dow; 
Table 3.  SQL Query for a Report  
 
New types of alerts or alert sources can be added by 
writing new parsing scripts to process the new types of 
alerts and insert them into the database. Alerts and 
incidents from different sources can be correlated with 
data from raw data logs by matching fields (usually 
host and/or time period).  
Searches against raw data logs launched 
transparently by the user are cached for later use. This 
speeds viewing and helps preserve the raw data in case 
it is aged and deleted from the original repository. 
In our current implementation we are able to 
correlate IDS alerts and other in-house developed alert 
generators with raw data from NetFlows logs. We are 
working to include syslog from web servers, main 
servers, and authentication servers.  
4.1  GUI Design 
 
Figure 2 shows the main web-based GUI for 
UCLog+. The system has different views and access 
control features for administrators and normal users. 
Administrators can view more sensitive information 
while the normal users can only access non-critical 
information regulated by the administrators. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. UCLog+ Web Interface 
 
Figure 3 shows the main report generation interface 
for UCLog+. The administrator can select different 
options to execute different types of queries. Queries 
can be displayed in tabular or graphical format. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  UCLog+ Query Interface 
 
Figure 4 shows a sample plot generated by UCLog+ 
-- the number of attacks per host and the frequency of 
the type of attacks. 
 
 
 
    Figure 4. UCLog+ Sample Visual Output 
 
 
4.2  System Security 
 
While the motivation for developing this system is 
to enhance security, it does present several security 
issues -- in particular: audit, unauthorized access and 
alert email validity. All modifications to database data 
should be logged. Access control policies and 
authentication are needed. Email messages sent to the 
server containing alerts to be included in the database 
must be signed to ensure that they come from an 
authorized source. For now we have a simple policy: 
 
Allow all or deny all, depending on the user.  A 
login and password is needed for viewing/ 
modifying data. SSL is used to secure HTTP 
communication. SSH is used for secure 
connections between the database and logs. 
 
5. Preliminary Results 
 
Preliminary results report that UCLog+ intuitively 
enables correlations between alerts, incidents, and raw 
data. The flexibility of the SQL queries adds value by 
obtaining information that would otherwise not be 
obtained due to effort. 
While in the past we have demonstrated correlation 
between alerts, UCLog+ enables new correlations  
between incidents inside the database and external raw 
data logs.  These correlations are typically focused on 
date/time and host IP address. When browsing through 
an incident report in the system, the user can click on a 
"show NetFlows" link which calls a PHP script that 
parses the appropriate NetFlows raw data log located 
in a different server available via an SSH connection 
over the Internet. For example, if an alert is generated 
for a particular IP address that is scanning – that IP 
address is noted (blacklisted) and at the click of mouse 
a query can be launched to NetFlows raw data logs 
requesting all IP addresses the blacklisted IP address 
has scanned during a given period (hour/day/week). 
The resulting query is transparently launched and 
executed remotely on the raw data log file and the IP 
address output is shown to the user in an HTML report.  
If one of the scan targets has appeared in one or more 
posterior alerts, a security engineer may again access 
the corresponding NetFlow raw data logs  through the 
UCLog+ interface to learn additional information such 
as the direction of flows (source/destination), port 
usage, etc. Lastly, if a security engineers identifies an 
attack patterns with specific packet sizes or ports, they 
can create new alert signatures to feedback to sensors 
(Closing-the-Loop). 
We have implemented UCLog+ using alerts from 
the BRO intrusion detection system, two years worth 
of incident records from NCSA’s response team, and 
Netflows raw data logs. After preloading historical 
data and setting up pipes for continuous loading of new 
data, UCLog+ was used to correlate information to 
learn about more about the types of attacks being 
experienced. We were able to find these interesting 
trends in attacks targeting NCSA.  
 
Attack Types: Of the various attacks on the NCSA 
server, we can see from Figure 5 that the Denial-of-
Service, Brute Force Password Attempts, and Port 
Scans comprise about 81.3% of all attacks.   
 
Timing of Attacks: From Figures 6 and  7, it can be 
seen that 83% of the attacks occur on weekdays and 
most of the attacks are in the time range 8am-6pm.  
This pattern is also mirrored in other attack 
distributions. 
 
Attack Patterns: The attacks from host X follow a 
fixed pattern. In Figure 14, it can be seen that the 
attack pattern matches a normal curve with mean 57 
and standard deviation 23.76.  While in Figure 15, it is 
observed that attacks form a pattern w.r.t. day and 
time, statistically it can be seen that the number of 
attacks on each of the days is about the same -- only 
standard deviation per day varies. 
 
Source of Attacks: 
Scans: One-fourth of the scans can be traced to 
different IP addresses in Netherlands  
Password Attacks: One-half of the password attacks 
from one host. 22% of the remaining from Australia 
and 11% from a specific internal machine. 
Password Attacks: One-half of the password attacks 
from one host. 22% of the remaining from Australia 
and 11% from a specific internal machine. 
Trend in Scanning: Most of the scans have been in 
the range 141.142.0.x and 141.142.110.x .  41.3% of 
scans in the IP address range 141.142.65.x and 
141.142.67.x, 13.33% in the range 141.142.2.x, 
14.67% in the range 141.142.96.x and 141.142.105.x 
and the remaining 2.67% in the range beyond 
141.142.200.x 
 
Trends in Password Attacks: The host X seems to be 
compromised with one of the attacks originating from 
within our internal network. The attacks pattern 
appears to be programmed to perform 25 
username/password combinations between the time 
range 2:05am to 2:21am and a 100 username/password 
combinations between the time range 8:45am to 
9:15am (Figure 13). 
 
Forensics: A new un-alerted incident was revealed. 
The alert is of a kind that requires investigation to 
determine if any damage has occurred (e.g. 
compromised hosts, etc.). With the UCLog+ system in 
place, a next logical step is to retrieve previous 
incidents related to one or more of the involved hosts. 
The query is shown in Table 4. This query leads to 
valuable information about the hosts involved (e.g. had 
been scanned in previous weeks by the host now trying 
dictionary attacks to brute-force access to it). 
 
SELECT * FROM incidents, hosts, emails, types 
WHERE host=hostid AND type=typeid AND email=emailid 
AND hosts.name='w.x.y.z' ORDER BY incidents.date; 
      Table 4.  Tracing Events Between Hosts 
 
Preventive Security: The list of top ten internal hosts 
(regarding appearance in incidents) can be obtained for 
careful analysis and patching of each to avoid future 
incidents. Table 5 shows the SQL query that 
determines this. 
 
SELECT hosts.name, hosts.ip,  
count(incidentid) AS cnt 
FROM hosts, incidents 
WHERE hosts.hostid=incidents.host 
GROUP BY hosts.name, hosts.ip 
ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 10; 
Table 5. Query for Top-10 Compromises 
 
Finding the Usual Suspects: If an external host is 
frequently appearing in incidents, careful analysis of 
these historical incidents will help understand why. If 
after analysis we determine that an external host is 
responsible for these incidents, we may notify the ISP 
of the external host or block access to that IP address.  
 
If an internal host is frequently appearing in incidents, 
careful analysis will help understand why this is 
happening and take preventive measures (e.g. if host is 
infected with a virus, the host must be ``cleaned''). In 
our experimental data, it can be seen from Figure 16 
that 7 hosts: A,B,C,D,E,F,G stand out as most 
frequently attacked hosts and therefore administrator’s 
efforts should be directed at taking preventive 
measures for these hosts. 
 
Policy Violation: A list of top ten internal hosts 
regarding type of anomaly (e.g. DoS) can be generated 
to investigate possible policy violations performed by 
the users of those hosts (e.g. illegal file/media sharing) 
and issue appropriate warnings to those users. Sample 
SQL code generating this report is shown in Table 6. 
 
SELECT hosts.name, hosts.ip,  
               count(incidentid) AS cnt 
FROM hosts, incidents, types 
WHERE hosts.hostid=incidents.host 
AND types.name = 'INCBAND' 
GROUP BY hosts.name, hosts.ip 
ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 10; 
Table 6. Query for Policy Violations   
 
Report Generation: Statistical incident information 
can be generated to include in reports, including 
percentages and graphs as Shown in Figures 6-13. For 
example, to evaluate if a new plan to secure the 
internal network is working, a trend analysis report 
over time listing the number of incidents per time 
period for multiple time periods can be displayed. The 
corresponding query is shown in Table 7. 
 
SELECT MOD((extract(MONTH FROM date)+12 - 
extract(MONTH FROM CURRENT_DATE)-1)::integer,12) AS pos, 
extract(MONTH FROM date) AS mon, count(incidentid) 
FROM incidents 
WHERE CURRENT_DATE - date < '365 days' 
GROUP BY mon ORDER BY pos; 
Table 7. Trend Analysis Report Generation  
 
Attacking the Problem at its Roots: Identifying 
recent ``first offenders'' (i.e. internal hosts that appear 
in an incident for the first time) can help in preventing 
future problems (e.g. by patching host, installing 
firewalls or warning users in case of policy violations). 
Table 8 shows the SQL query for finding recent first 
offenders. 
 
SELECT hosts.name, ip, MAX(date) 
FROM hosts, incidents 
WHERE hostid=host AND CURRENT_DATE - date < '1 month' 
GROUP BY date,hosts.name, hosts.ip 
ORDER BY date DESC LIMIT 10; 
Table 8.  Query for Recent Successful Attacks 
 
 
Figure 5. Attack Type Distribution 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Attack Distribution by Day of Week  Figure 7. Attack Distribution by Time 
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    Figure 8. Scan Distribution by Day of Week 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 9. Scan Distribution by Time 
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       Figure 10. DoS Attack Distribution by Day 
 
 
 
Figure 11. DoS Attack Distribution by Time 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Password Attack Distribution by Day   Figure 13. Password Attack Distribution by Time 
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Figure 16.  “The Usual Suspects” – Histograms of Frequently Compromised Computers 
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Weakness Identification and Targeting: Identifying 
the most frequent types of incidents in the 
organization's computer network can be critical when 
establishing future network security plans because it 
can help better target the security measures and 
identify weaknesses, leading to a reduced number of 
incidents. The SQL query is shown in Table 9. 
 
SELECT types.name, count(incidentsid) AS cnt 
FROM types, incidents 
WHERE typeid=type 
GROUP BY types.name ORDER BY cnt; 
Table 9. Query to Identify Frequent Attacks 
 
6. Summary 
 
UCLog+ is a data management system for different 
forms of security data. UCLog+ pulls alerts and 
incidents into a centralized database that can be 
accessed via a web interface.  The novel contribution 
of UCLog+ is the ability to also transparently 
incorporate raw data logs located across networks into 
the same system with the centralized database so 
pertinent information that otherwise would not be used 
can now be used in security analysis.  The opposite 
approach -- to load raw data logs into a centralized 
database -- is not scalable, our UCLog+ approach is 
not only more scalable but also more reliable and more 
secure.   
In this paper we used security data in the form of 
alerts, incidents, and raw data logs but other sources 
may be incorporated due to modular design.   The 
preliminary results using UCLog+ we report here 
provide insight into attack trends on our network.  
Future work continues on developing UCLog+ so it 
can be shared via Internet download. When the code 
becomes stable we intend to transition to open source. 
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